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The Human Genome Project and the
Downside of Federal Technology Transfer*
Christopher J. Harnett**
Introduction - Technology Transfer at NIH
In adopting a technology transfer policy largely dictated by the
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA),' the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) has increasingly encouraged collaborations
between its researchers and private industry. Indeed, under the FTTA,
technology transfer is regarded as an essential part of a researcher's job
description, and promotion and positive job performance evaluation are
contingent upon successful technology transfer efforts.2 The FTTA
also provides financial incentives for government scientists to transfer
technology to the private sector.3
By implementing the FTTA, the Reagan Administration sought to
increase the return on the nation's research and development (R&D)
investment by generating new products and processes and by enhancing
international competitiveness. 4 Furthermore, that administration
predicted that the FTTA would be viewed in retrospect as "one of the
seminal developments in the history of federal efforts to put technology
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect or
suggest the views of Fish & Neave or any of its clients.
** Mr. Harnett is an associate with the law firm of Fish & Neave in New York. He
received his B.A. (English and Biology) from the State University of New York at
Binghamton, his M.A. (Cellular Biology) from American University and J.D. from
Georgetown University.
1 The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1986)).
2 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a).
3 NIH/ADAMHA/CDC/FDA Office of Technology Transfer, 1992 PHS
Technology Transfer Directory.
4 Robert Mosbocher, The Federal Technology Transfer Act 1986: The First Three
Years, Report to the President and the Congress from the Secretary of Commerce,
(1989.
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to work for the taxpayers who paid for it" even though the Act
challenged "long held views on the proper role of Federal laboratories
and scientists." 5
Since the implementation of the FTTA, NIH/industry
collaborations have flourished. The NIH reports that, by the end of
fiscal year 1993, its researchers were actively involved in 103 separate
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with
collaborating companies. According to NIH, CRADAs are
instrumental in achieving the FTTA's objective of assisting "universities
and the private sector in broadening our national technological base by
moving new knowledge from the research laboratory into the
development of new products and processes." 6
While promoting introduction of new products and enhancing
American competitiveness through commercialization of federally-
funded biomedical research are legitimate public policy goals,
commentators have noted that there, is a distinct downside to the
technology transfer policies embodied by the FTTA. For example, as
implemented by NIH, the provisions of the FTTA inappropriately
influence the direction of biomedical research. By placing an inordinate
premium on research with immediately apparent commercial rewards,
the FTTA policies tend to skew the direction of research decidedly
away from basic scientific investigation. Thus, over the long run, the
FTTA policies threaten to adversely affect the continued vitality of the
federal biomedical research establishment. 7 Furthermore, mandatory
collaboration between federal researchers and private industry may have
a corrupting effect on NIH research by magnifying the potential for
conflicts of interest and restricted dissemination of information among
scientists. 8
5 Id, at 2.
6 NIH Office of Technology Transfer, NIH/ADAMHA/CDC Policy Statement
on Cooperative Research and Development Agreements and Intellectual Property
Licensing (1992).
7 See, Christopher J. Harnett, Federal Technology Transfer: Should We Build
Subarus in Bethesda? 1 Risk 313 (1990).
8 See, e.g., Janet Bass, Privately University Funded Research May Breed
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The foregoing problems associated with the FTTA's policies are
evident in current NIH research initiatives, including the Human
Genome Project. Indeed, the recent controversial NIH decision to file
applications seeking patent protection for more than 2,700 partial
complementary DNA (cDNA) fragments has been met with warnings
that pursuing such patents will have a negative impact on the
international cooperation and open communication betwen genome
scientists necessary for the prompt and successful completion of the
Human Genome Project.9 Critics also note the potential for conflicts
of interest 1 0 and distortions in the conduct of basic biomedical
research11 as a result of the NIH patenting decision.
Analysis of the NIH cDNA patenting decision reveals yet another
problem: the existence of patent rights to the partial cDNA fragments,
and any attempts by NIH to license those rights, may significantly
impede development of related products. This potential impediment to
product development will be discussed in detail below.
Using the NIH decision to pursue the cDNA patents as a case
study, this article will argue that the NIH decision reflects an
inappropriate merger of NIH interests with the interests of the private
biotechnology industry. Because the FTTA mandates collaborations
between federal scientists and private industry, it is inevitable that NIH
will confuse its proper technology transfer goals with the
commercialization interests of private sector collaborators. NIH justifies
its controversial patenting decision as an attempt to provide an incentive
for private industry to commercially develop products related to the
partial cDNA fragments. That decision may, therefore, be viewed as a
natural and predictable outgrowth of federal technology transfer
Conflicts, United Press Intn'l, June 13, 1989; William Booth, NIH Scientists
Agonize Over Technology Transfer, 243 Science 20, 21 (1989); Barbara Culliton,
NIH, Inc.: The CRADA Boom, 245 Science 1036 (1989).
9 See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254 Science 184 (1991).
10 See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, Genome Project Goes Commercial, 259
Science 300 (1993).
11 See, Statement of the National Institutes of Health-Department of Energy
Subcommittee for Interagency Coordination of Human Genome Research, Jan. 3,
1992.
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policies. However, implementation of such policies may actually
impede development of related products, thereby subverting one of the
primary objectives of the FTTA. In light of this potentially paradoxical
result, NIH should reexamine its implementation of FTTA policies.
NIH's cDNA Patent Applications
As noted above, NIH has been widely criticized for filing
applications in June 1991 and February 1992 seeking patent protection
for partial cDNA sequences identified by Dr. Craig Venter, then a
genome project researcher working at the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Those applications were directed
to, inter alia, approximately 2,700 expressed sequence tags (ESTs) that
were isolated from commercially available and custom-made cDNA
libraries. ESTs are short cDNA sequences, about 150-400 base pairs in
length that correspond to the coding sequence of an expressed gene. 12
The ESTs described in the Venter applications correspond to individual
genes expressed in the human brain.
Using conventional techniques, ESTs can serve as a starting point to
fully sequence corresponding expressed genes. While ESTs indicate that
a gene exists and is expressed, they do not shed light on the biological
activity or function of that gene.
Both Venter patent applications claim the 2,700 expressed sequence
tags, the full length genes corresponding to the ESTs, and
miscellaneous antisense oligonucleotides and triple helix probes. The
June 1991 application also claims proteins coded by the genes.
12 By way of simplified relevant background, individual genes comprise: regulatory
regions including a promoter that directs expression of the gene; a coding region that
codes for a polypeptide; and a termination signal. Gene expression proceeds from
DNA to messenger RNA (mRNA) to a polypeptide. In a two step process, mRNA
can be converted to double stranded cDNA by reverse transcriptase and a DNA
polymerase.
The coding regions of genes may be discontinuous: coding sequences known as
exons may alternate with non-coding regions known as introns. The mRNA includes
exons but does not include introns. A fill length cDNA, therefore, is a double
stranded DNA copy of a mRNA that contains all of the exons of a gene. ESTs, such
as those described in the Venter applications, are partial cDNA sequences that can be
used to identify the full-length cDNA "clone" of an expressed gene.
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Critics of the NIH patent decision argue that, because Venter's
ESTs do not teach the biological activity of the gene, attempts to
obtain broad patent protection based on those ESTs are premature and
inappropriate. For example, Nobel laureate Paul Berg commented that
"patenting bits and pieces of sequence that are meaningless
functionally... makes a mockery of what most people feel is the right
way to do the Genome Project."13
NIH, however, justified its decision to file patent applications as an
effort to promote the public good and to fulfill NIH's statutory
technology transfer obligations and objectives.14 Reid G. Adler,
Director of the NIH Office of Technology Transfer, reported that the
decision was motivated by a desire to protect Venter's invention "early
enough to give meaningful patent protection to companies that might
seek a license from NIH." 15 Indeed, NIH's efforts to license the
Venter invention commenced within months of filing the first
application. 16
Moreover, NIH was concerned that publishing Venter's discoveries
and data without first filing patent applications might render obvious
and unpatentable future discoveries such as the elucidation of whole
genes corresponding to Venter's ESTs. 17 NIH feared that the
13 Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round Two, 255 Science 912 (1992).
Even more strident were the comments of another Nobel laureate, James Watson,
who expressed horror over NIH's attempt to obtain patent protection for Venter's
ESTs because, in Watson's view, using commonly available automated sequencing
machines "virtually any monkey" could identify ESTs. See, supra note 9.
14 Remarks of Dr. Bernadine Healy at the Fourth Annual PHS Technology Transfer
Forum, November 14, 1991. Dr. Healy commented that:
NIH has a record of utilizing the patent system in a socially
responsible way. When NIH does move into the patent arena it is
with the public good as a driving force and not because scientists
want to get rich.
Dr. Healy also noted that "the real concern" would be if a big pharmaceutical
company got all of the gene patents. Developments since November 1991,
demonstrate that the NIH decision to pursue partial cDNA sequence patent did not
preclude private concerns from following suit. For example, Incyte Pharmaceuticals
Inc., of Palo Alto, California is reportedly planning to file patent applications for as
many as 100,000 cDNA sequences a year; see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 10.
15 Supra note 9, at 185.
16 Id.
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potential loss of patentability for future discoveries would create a
disincentive for companies to perform the subsequent research necessary
to bring valuable products to market.18
The NIH justification for filing the Venter patent applications is
troublesome because it suggests that NIH actions were driven by the
commercial concerns of its private sector collaborators. As a public
institution with its primary mission "to conduct biomedical ... research
that will lead to the better health of the American people," 19 it seems
inappropriate for NIH to predicate major policy decisions on the desire
to insuie the existence of meaningful licenses for its private sector
collaborators, and to preserve the existence of future exclusive rights for
those collaborators. 2 0 The troublesome nature of the NIH cDNA
patent decision extends beyond philosophical concerns about the proper
role of the NIH vis a vis private industry- there are practical
implications as well. Because of the undeveloped nature of the Venter
technology, there is little likelihood that NIH patenting and subsequent
licencing efforts would have effectively advanced the commercial
development of related products. In fact, as will be discussed below, the
existence of any patent or licensing rights would be likely to impede
commercial development of clinically useful products and processes
related to Venter's discoveries.
17 A thorough discussion of the merits of this concern is beyond the scope of this
article. For further discussion, see, e.g., Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling
The Publics Expectations For Knowledge And Commercialization, 257 Science 908
(August 14, 1992); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, And Product
Development, 257 Science 903 (August 14, 1992).
18 See, supra note 9. See also, testimony of Dr. J. Craig Venter before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Sept. 22, 1992.
19 Supra note 3.
20 See, Association of Biotechnology Companies, Statement on NIH Patent Filing
for the Human Genome Project (May 1992): "Whether future patent claims are
obtainable.., is not the concern of the NIH, which should not become engaged in
schemes designed to ensure future exclusivity."
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Possible Scope of Patent Protection
NIH's ability to license its technology depended, in large measure,
on the scope of the claims, if any, that would have eventually been
allowed by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). In its initial
response to the Venter applications, the PTO rejected the NIH claims
because they did not satisfy the three fundamental requirements for
patentability - utility, novelty and non-obviousness. 2 1 The NIH was
expected to file a response to the initial PTO rejection by February
1993, and a final decision of the PTO was expected in early 1994.
However, after NIH learned that the PTO planned to reject its claims,
it abandoned the application in early February 1994.22
Because Venter's partial cDNA sequences do nothing to elucidate
the biological activity of the genes, the issue of patentable utility with
respect to the Venter disclosure has drawn considerable attention from
commentators. 2 3 NIH argued that the Venter invention has
patentable utility because the disclosed partial cDNA sequences can be
used: 1) as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) primers; 2) to isolate the
coding sequence of cDNAs; 3) to isolate complete genes; 4) to
determine the position of genes on the human chromosome; 5) to
produce antisense oligonucleotides and triple helix probes; and 6) in
forensic applications. 24
While the utility requirement is typically considered a low hurdle
to patentability,2 5 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the utility
requirement is not satisfied if an invention is useful only in research.26
Because, as the PTO suggested, Venter's sequences were useful merely
21 Governed by 35 U.S.C. % 101, 102 and 103, respectively.
22 Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 Science 909
(1994).
23 See, e.g., Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA
Fragments? 257 Science 915 (1992).
24 Patent application of Craig Venter: Sequences Characteristic of Human Gene
Transcription Product. A partially redacted version of this application is available
through the NIH Office of Technology Transfer.
25 See, e.g., Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Envirotech
Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26 Brennerv. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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as a means for making discoveries, the claims were rejected for lack of
utility.2 7 Furthermore, considering the high-profile and controversial
nature of the present case, the PTO may have been inclined to apply
the utility standard very stringently.2 8
As noted above, the claims of both Venter patent applications
encompassed much more than the disclosed ESTs. The specifications of
those applications describe, in detail, procedures for identifying and
sequencing the ESTs, procedures for identifying the sequence of a gene
using an EST as a starting point, and procedures for accomplishing gene
expression. The Venter disclosure, however, does not identify the full
length sequence of previously unknown genes, identify the polypeptides
coded by those genes, or teach the biological activity of those genes or
polypeptides. As such, had NIH decided to appeal, there is
considerable doubt that Venter would have been entitled to claims
directed to full length genes or polypeptides coded by those genes.2 9
Indeed, recent case law suggests that, even assuming the utility, novelty
and nonobviousness standards are satisfied, Venter would not be
entitled to claims that extend much beyond the specifically disclosed
EST sequences. 3 0 Thus, it appears that even if NIH could have
prevailed on the issue of utility, the scope of claims that might have
been allowed is likely to have been substantially narrower than the
claims filed in the applications.
27 Manson, 383 U.S., at 536, "But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a
reward for the search, but a compensation for its successful conclusion."
28 The PTO occasionally applies unusually stringent utility standards to promote
what it considers to be public policy objectives. For example, the PTO has recently
shown reluctance to allow claims directed to treatment of HIV infection where the
claimed effectiveness is supported only by in vitro data; see, e.g., In re Balzarini,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1892 (B.P.A.I. 1991). In the past, claims directed to treatment of
human cancers were also rejected on the basis of "incredible" utility; see, e.g.,
Application of Citron, 325 F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
29 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257
Science 903 (August 14, 1992).
30 See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed.Cir. 1993); see also Amgen Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.Cir. 1991).
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Possible Licensing Consequences
Federal patent laws in effect since 1980 have permitted and
encouraged licensing of government owned patent rights. 3 1 Under the
FTTA, federal laboratories can agree to grant intellectual property
rights in advance to collaborators who are party to a CRADA. 32 The
NIH technology transfer policy relies heavily on the patent system, and
in its general licensing policy, NIH states that, "Congress and the
President have chosen to utilize the patent system as the primary
mechanism for transferring Government inventions to the private
sector." 33 Indeed, NIH officials have suggested that patent protection
for the cDNA sequences is necessary to induce potential licensees to
commit the time and financial resources to develop commercially viable
products derived from the NIH's cDNA discoveries. 34
Federal statutes directed to technology licensing balance the need
for exclusivity to induce commercial development against the possible
adverse consequences of an unnecessary monopoly. Consequently, NIH
licensing policies, in most circumstances, favor non-exclusive licenses
over exclusive licenses. 3 5 However, consistent with a fundamental
principle of the patent system,3 6 NIH is willing to "grant exclusive
commercialization licenses under their patent or other intellectual
property rights in cases where substantial additional risks, time and
costs must be undertaken by a licensee prior to commercialization." 37
31 See, Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, P.L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 200-212 (1990)).
32 Supra note 3, at 307, 309.
33 Supra note 3, at 309.
34 Testimony of Dr. Bernadine Healy before the Subcomm on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Sept. 22, 1992.
35 Supra note 3, at 310.
36 See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985), "The patent
system, which is rooted in the United States Constitution serves a very positive
function in our system of competition, i.e., 'the encouragement of investment based
risk."' (citations omitted).
See also, U.S. Const., Art 1. §. 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have power... to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
37 Supra note 3.
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Federal law, however, permits a federal agency to license its
inventions on an exclusive basis only if it is determined that: 1) the
public interest is served by the exclusive license in light of the
prospective licensee's plans and ability to promote the public's
utilization of the invention; 2) the practical development of the
invention has not or is not likely to be expeditiously achieved under a
non-exclusive license; 3) the exclusive license is required to attract
capital and stimulate interest needed to develop the invention; and
4) the proposed scope of the exclusive license is not broader than is
necessary to accomplish development of the invention. 3 8 Moreover,
NIH reserves the right to revoke an exclusive license if the licensee fails
to make reasonable progress in developing the invention or if the
licensee cannot satisfy unmet public health needs. 39
Attempts by NIH to license any patent that might have issued from
its applications would be problematic. As discussed above, the claims of
such a patent would likely be narrow. One commentator has suggested
that claims limited to the specifically disclosed ESTs and their
equivalents would not be "broad enough to offer effective protection to
firms seeking to bring related products to market...."40 The private
sector, therefore, might not be interested in licensing them, either
exclusively or non-exclusively. As such, the NIH patent would do
nothing to advance the development of commercial products or
processes and might indeed have hindered such developments by
contributing to the "thicket of patent rights that firms must negotiate
their way past before they can get products on the market."4 1
On the other hand, if NIH had been somehow entitled to broader
patent coverage (or if private sector participants had been nonetheless
interested in licensing a narrow patent), then NIH would have had to
38 35 U.S.C. § 209(c)(1); see also 37 C.F.L § 404.7.
39 Supra note 3, at 311.
40 Supra note 29.
41 Id., at 904. See,also, Leslie Roberts, Scientists Voice Their Opposition, 256
Science 1273 (1992). Michael Roth, a patent attorney at Pioneer Hybrid comments
that the NIH patent approach "does not build a road to further advances, it just
builds a toll booth along the way."
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determine whether an exclusive or non-exclusive license was
appropriate. Because the vast majority of the 2,700 genes corresponding
to Venter's ESTs were not likely to be immediately significant for
clinical applications, the Venter patent applications dearly presented a
situation where substantial (and risky) expenditures of time and money
would be necessary before any commercially viable product could have
been marketed. Thus, potential licensees are unlikely to have been
interested without an exclusive license.
As discussed above, the technology claimed in the NIH applications
was not well developed and encompassed vast subject matter -
Venter's claims may theoretically "read on" approximately 5% of all
expressed human genes. Exclusive use of those ESTs would, thus have
provided an extreme disincentive for non-licensees to investigate the
biological significance of the 2,700 expressed genes and polypeptides
corresponding to Venter's partial cDNA sequences. Such a disincentive
could have resulted in a "meta-monopoly" whereby a single entity
would acquire de facto dominion over the eventual identification of
2,700 genes, their gene products and methods of exploiting their
biological activity. Such a meta-monopoly may run afoul of patent
licensing laws4 2 and would do nothing to aid development of useful
products. 43 Exclusivity over Venter's discoveries could have caused a
result decried by the Supreme Court:44
Such a patent may confer power to block off whole
areas of scientific development, without compensating
development to the public. The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the
public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless
and until a process is developed to this point - where
specific benefit exists in currently available form - there
is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to
engross what may prove to be a broad field.
42 35 U.S.C. § 209.
43 Craig Venter himself states that "The patent system wasn't designed to give me
and a small group of people ownership of half the genome." Supra note 41.
44 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S., at 534-535.
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Thus, either exclusive or non-exclusive licenses for any patents that
might have issued from the NIH applications could have stood in the
way of ultimately developing clinically useful products related to
Venter's ESTs. With NIH having abandoned its applications, a greater
degree of access to that technology has been realized.
Conclusion
The NIH decision to seek patent protection for Dr. Venter's
substantially undeveloped discoveries demonstrated that NIH's tech-
nology transfer activities were driven by the commercial objectives of its
private sector collaborators, and its decision to abandon them may have
been similarly motivated. 4 5 Merger of NIH and private sector
objectives is an inevitable consequence of the NIH's implementation of
the FTTA. Such a merger threatens to shift the focus of NIH research,
compromise the objectivity of that research and, in certain
circumstances, impede the ultimate introduction of products ultimately
developed from NIH research. Thus, NIH policies that overzealously
promote private commercial interests should be reconsidered.
This author believes that the progress of science and the interests of
the public are best served by maintaining NIH as an objective research
institution rather than a vehicle for advancing the commercial interests
of private biomedical research concerns. The biotechnology industry
does not need NIH to protect its commercial interests - those
interests are adequately protected by numerous individual private
companies and by their lobbying groups. The public, however, does
need NIH to continue to perform high-level objective research in order
to preserve the status of the U.S. as the world leader in biomedical
sciences.
45 Supra note 22, at 910.
